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Abstract
Overconfidence has long been considered a cause of war. Like other decision-making biases, overconfidence seems
detrimental because it increases the frequency and costs of fighting. However, evolutionary biologists have proposed that
overconfidence may also confer adaptive advantages: increasing ambition, resolve, persistence, bluffing opponents, and
winning net payoffs from risky opportunities despite occasional failures. We report the results of an agent-based model of
inter-state conflict, which allows us to evaluate the performance of different strategies in competition with each other.
Counter-intuitively, we find that overconfident states predominate in the population at the expense of unbiased or
underconfident states. Overconfident states win because: (1) they are more likely to accumulate resources from frequent
attempts at conquest; (2) they are more likely to gang up on weak states, forcing victims to split their defences; and (3)
when the decision threshold for attacking requires an overwhelming asymmetry of power, unbiased and underconfident
states shirk many conflicts they are actually likely to win. These ‘‘adaptive advantages’’ of overconfidence may, via selection
effects, learning, or evolved psychology, have spread and become entrenched among modern states, organizations and
decision-makers. This would help to explain the frequent association of overconfidence and war, even if it no longer brings
benefits today.
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Introduction
War is deemed a puzzle because if states were rational, they
could avoid the costs of fighting in a pre-war bargain that reflected
their relative power [1]. Of course, there are several caveats to
such an expectation: strong states may anticipate the spoils of
conquest [2,3], and weak states may anticipate an improvement in
their bargaining position, favourable intervention by third parties,
or superior strategies and resolve [4,5,6,7]. Nevertheless, war
remains puzzling because it occurs even when these caveats are
absent or unlikely, and both sides would be better off avoiding
violence.
One solution to the war puzzle, long noted by historians and
political scientists, is that people and states tend to be
overconfident about their chances of success, reducing the
perceived costs of war and increasing its perceived benefits
[8,9,10,11]. A general bias towards overconfidence has also been
noted in economics [12], law [13], management [14], finance [15],
and negotiation [16]. Indeed, the phenomenon of overconfidence
is a standard result within the psychological literature, which finds
that most normal people tend to exhibit cognitive and motiva-
tional biases exaggerating their capabilities, their illusion of control
over events, and their perceived invulnerability to risk, collectively
termed ‘‘positive illusions’’ [17,18]. If anything, such individual
level biases appear to be further exacerbated at the group,
organizational and state levels [6,19,20,21], and historical analyses
suggest that states and organizations also frequently fail to update
their behaviour given past failures [22,23,24]. Nobel Laureate
Daniel Kahneman recently concluded that, of all the psychological
biases he and his colleagues have uncovered over the last 40 years
of the ‘‘cognitive revolution’’, all of them promote hawkish
decision-making [25].
There is growing support for a causal link between overconfi-
dence and war: experimental war games found that overconfident
individuals were more likely to make unprovoked attacks on their
opponents [26]; recent case study analyses found that variation in
confidence among state decision-makers during crises correlated
with whether or not war broke out [8,9,11,27]; and quantitative
analyses of inter-state wars show that initiators have lost one-
quarter to one-half of the wars they started since 1500 [28], and
this has increased to a majority of wars since 1945 [7,29].
The larger question that remains unresolved is why people
exhibit a bias towards overconfidence in situations of conflict,
given that overconfidence appears to invoke significant costs—
preventing peaceful outcomes and increasing the frequency,
expense, and risks of war (for example, by provoking more
powerful opponents) [1,9]. One possibility is that although
overconfidence may sometimes lead to mistakes, on average and
over time, overconfidence may in fact promote advantageous
decisions, signals or behaviour after all (or may have done so in
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they amount to systematic errors in assessment, positive illusions
have been argued to serve the interests of those that hold them
because they promote ambition, creativity, persistence, and
performance in a variety of tasks and contexts [17]. Recently, it
has specifically been suggested that positive illusions were favoured
by natural selection because they were adaptive in conflict settings
in our evolutionary past, serving to increase resolve and
persistence [30], to bluff opponents [30,31,32] and, where the
stakes are high enough, to exploit risky opportunities that generate
a higher net pay off despite the costs of occasional failures [33,34].
Of course, overconfidence can also be a conscious political tactic
to boost morale, rally support, or deter rivals. But, as Robert
Trivers has argued, an evolved psychological bias towards
genuine, self-deceptive overconfidence would be especially effective
because it generates more convincing beliefs and signals, reducing
behavioural ‘‘leakage’’ from sham confidence that might give the
game away to opponents [31,32]. Whether overconfidence serves
adaptive advantages in the setting of international conflict,
however, remains an untested question.
Methods
Since it is not possible to conduct real-world experiments on
whether overconfidence is adaptive or not in international conflict,
an alternative analytical tool is offered by agent-based models
(ABMs) [35,36]. ABMs have enjoyed increasing popularity in
recent years as a way of exploring problems that remain beyond
the reaches of experimental or analytical methods. Many such
models have been inspired by evolutionary approaches [37], in
which agents with different attributes compete with each other
according to predefined behavioural rules. Successful strategies are
replicated and spread while unsuccessful strategies die out, leading
to evolutionary change in the proportions of each strategy in the
population. ABMs have been applied to a wide range of problems,
including studies of cooperation as well as conflict, identifying
conditions that give rise, for example, to grouping behaviour [38],
moralistic behaviour [39], cooperation in noisy conditions [40],
and cooperation in spatial public goods games [41].
For our purposes, ABMs are useful because they allow us to
compare the performance of overconfident states in competition
with unbiased and underconfident states in a simulated spatial
environment. Using a custom written ABM and following
previously established protocols [35,42,43], we examined the
relative performance of states in competition with each other on a
30630 spatial grid (see Supporting Information for results with
alternative parameter settings). The cells of the grid constitute
‘‘provinces’’, and actors are represented by states of $1 contiguous
provinces (see Figure 1). At each time step, states assess their
neighbours and interact according to predefined decision-rules
(described in full below). They attack if they identify a weaker
opponent, and conflict outcomes are determined by a function of
the warring states’ relative resources (R). The process is then
repeated over many generations.
We operationalize overconfidence by assigning each state a
‘‘confidence factor’’ a. A state’s own perceived resource level is given
by aR, so states with a.1 are overconfident, states with a=1 are
unbiased, and states with 0,a,1 are underconfident. While states
with a?1 distort the perception of their own strength, other states
are not gullible and always see rivals’ true strength. This is
important for two reasons. First, the psychological literature on
positive illusions shows that people tend to overestimate their own
capabilities and prospects, but people are not biased when
evaluating the attributes of third parties [17,18,44]. Second, if
other states were gullible and believed the overconfident claims of
aggressors, they would simply back off in the face of a bluff and
concede, making overconfidence automatically advantageous;
obviously we did not want to prime the model towards this trivial
outcome.
aR is only used in deciding whether or not to fight. Actual R is used
in determining war outcomes. Initial a values are randomly drawn
from a log-normal distribution, which bounds values at zero but
allows some states to have very high levels of overconfidence (this
mimics reality: values less than zero are meaningless, while the
long positive tail allows for a few very overconfident states). With
an underlying m=0 and s=1, this distribution means that
simulations begin with a population that is unbiased as a whole,
with median a=1.
For each of the initial N states (default N=50), one province is
chosen to host the capital. In each time step, all states
synchronously execute 5 sub-procedures [35,42]: (1) resource
extraction phase—the state extracts one unit of resources from each
of its provinces and adds it to its current resource level (all states
begin life with 10 units per province); (2) decision phase—states assess
the probability p of defeating each neighbour, and attack the state
conferring the highest p (as long as p exceeds a given ‘‘attack
threshold’’ w, default w=0.5); (3) resource-allocation phase—states
divide resources among all ‘‘active fronts’’ (wars with neighbouring
states, whoever initiated them) in proportion to the size of each of
those states; (4) interaction phase—war outcomes are determined by a
logistic conflict success function (CSF) [45]:
p~
1
1z
r
r0
 {k
in which the likelihood p of winning for an attacker depends on the
share r of its own resources RA allocated to the fight, compared
Figure 1. Initial starting conditions for a random simulation
run, showing the simulation boundary (outer edges), state
borders (black lines), and state capitals (black dots). Colours
indicate different types of states (red: overconfident states, green:
unbiased or underconfident states).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020851.g001
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attacking and target state (RA+RT). r0 controls the proportion of
resources at which the odds of winning are equal, and is kept
constant at 0.5 throughout all simulations. A slope parameter k
determines the decisiveness of conflict (i.e., how much resource
differentials influence outcomes; default k=5). The CSF is public
information, so when making decisions about whether or not to
fight, states can compute their true probability of defeating an
opponent with a given resource level (although a states’ perceived
resources may differ from their actual resources, if a?1). The only
thing that states cannot anticipate is whether some of their own or
their opponent’s resources will have to be diverted elsewhere (if
they, and/or their opponent, are attacked by a third party and
thereby forced to open up a second front in that same time step).
This uncertainty is, however, quite realistic (consider the
uncertainty about many states’ intentions prior to 1914, the US
in 1917, Britain in 1938, or Russia, Japan, and the US in 1941).
Finally, (5) structural change phase—the winning state gains a
randomly selected adjacent province from the loser’s territory.
Provinces become independent states if their capital is: (1)
captured; or (2) geographically cut off [35]. Such ‘‘newborn’’
states inherit the strategy (a) of their former state. No other
processes of geopolitical change, such as secession of a subset of a
state, can occur in the current model.
Overconfident states overestimate their relative resources (and
hence their chances of winning wars against other states, see
Figure 2), and will therefore attack more frequently since they
perceive more viable targets. This means that overconfident actors
should do worse than unbiased or underconfident states because
they fight extra wars, and these extra wars will always be against
stronger states, which they will tend to lose. The null hypothesis,
then, is that overconfident states should be wiped out of the
population. However, does this prediction hold in an n-player,
spatial setting?
Results
In stark contrast to the prediction, overconfidence consistently
emerges as the predominant strategy in the model (see Figure 3;
Movie S1 in the Supporting Information shows an example of a
single simulation run). This result is robust to large changes in
model parameters (e.g. size of the grid, whether it has boundaries
or is a continuous surface, initial polarity, k, and distribution of a;
see Supporting Information Table S1). However, the best
performing states have a middling level of overconfidence: states
with extremely high or low a do not perform well, suggesting that
there is an ‘‘optimal margin of illusion’’, as has been suggested in
the psychology literature [46]. The superior performance of
overconfident states can be attributed to three different phenom-
ena, discussed in turn below: the ‘‘lottery effect’’, offensive
alliances, and attack thresholds.
The ‘‘lottery effect’’
We call the first phenomenon the lottery effect. Even though
overconfident states are expected to lose more wars, they also enter
more wars than unbiased or underconfident states—effectively
‘‘buying more lottery tickets’’ in the competition for survival.
Many of these overconfident states will overreach themselves and
be destroyed, but others will, by chance, enjoy consecutive
victories and expand quickly. Overconfident states—and their
associated high levels of a—are therefore more likely to be
represented among the states that survive than are unbiased or
underconfident states. If this seems counter-intuitive, note that all
states—even overconfident ones—maximize p (the probability of
defeating an opponent) in deciding which neighbour to attack (see
Methods), so aggressive states tend to choose weaker targets rather
than stronger targets just like any other state. However, because
they pick more fights overall than anyone else, overconfident states
have the best chance of gaining new territory and expanding. By
contrast, underconfident or unbiased states are more likely to fight
only when they are victims of attack by stronger neighbours and
therefore tend to be destroyed by gradual attrition. Overconfident
states also benefit from positive feedback: states that gain an early
size advantage enjoy increased resources (R), which compounds
their advantage as they are increasingly likely to win subsequent
wars as a result, as well as accruing relative gains by denying rivals
finite resources with which to compete in the future (akin to the
advantages of ‘‘spiteful’’ territorial expansion among animals
proposed by Verner [47]).
Offensive alliances
The second reason for the success of overconfident states is that
their targets will often be the simultaneous targets of other
neighbouring states in the same time step (being the weakest in the
vicinity). Because such a victim has to split its defensive resources
to fight both (or more) attackers, the probability of defeating the
weak state is increased even further. Since overconfident states are
more likely to attack other states in the first place, they are also
more likely to benefit from this effect. Thus, there can be offensive
‘‘alliances’’ that emerge automatically in the model (without any
cooperation or planning). Obviously, if the model were contrived
to allow defensive alliances, these could help to protect weak states
and decrease the advantage of overconfident states. However,
what is interesting is that the model shows that offensive alliances
can emerge spontaneously on their own, whereas defensive
alliances cannot (they would need higher level mechanisms of
coordination and commitment to solve the problem of collective
action and preventing free-riders).
Attack Thresholds
Another important influence on the relative success of
alternative strategies is the attack threshold (w)—the power
asymmetry required for states to attack another. All our
simulations presented above set the attack threshold at 0.5
(meaning that unbiased states only attack if the odds are in their
favour). However, altering w has an important effect on optimum
levels of confidence. If w,0.5, then underconfident states are
favoured (notwithstanding some persistence of the other phenom-
ena outlined above), because both unbiased and overconfident
states would increase their frequency of attacks against stronger
states that they are likely to lose against. This would give rise to an
especially peaceful world dominated by cautious states. By
contrast, if w.0.5, then overconfident states are favoured—even
more than they already were in the simulations presented above—
because both underconfident and unbiased states would decrease
their frequency of attacks against states that they are actually likely
to defeat. This would give rise to an especially war prone world
dominated by belligerent states. Although overconfidence may be
a dangerous strategy for any one state (many such states die), in a
world in which wars tend not to happen unless one state has an
overwhelming power advantage (w.0.5), it is an overconfident
state that is likely to become king. Because of this logic, increasing
w makes overconfidence a more successful strategy than it already
is. This effect is ironic, because it means that in a world in which
states are reluctant to attack without a significant power advantage
(w.0.5; which is arguably closer to the real world than the other
way around [48,49]), the states that come to dominate are,
paradoxically, more likely to be overconfident (akin to the United
Adaptive Advantages of Overconfidence in War
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of equal strength (RA=R T). The curve shows how the estimated probability of success for actor A changes with its confidence factor a. When a=1
(signifying an unbiased actor), state A assesses its chances of winning correctly as 0.5. Overconfident states (a.1) overestimate their true probability
of winning, and underconfident states (a,1) underestimate their true probability of winning, with asymptotes of winning probability at 0 and 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020851.g002
Figure 3. Results of simulations showing how the confidence of surviving states changes over time. Panel A shows a single example
simulation run, with a typical pattern that the median confidence factor undergoes significant variation over time but stabilizes at a level well above
1. In this case, the strategy that comes to predominate is one that overestimates its resources by a factor of around 4. Panel B shows median
confidence factors aggregated over 200 runs of the simulation. Simulations were terminated if there were 50 time steps with no fighting, or if only
one state was left. In the majority of cases, only one state remained.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020851.g003
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underestimating the costs nevertheless).
Overconfidence versus aggression and risk-taking
Note that the key behavioural difference between overconfident
actors and other actors was that they were more likely to attack a
given opponent. This suggests that anything that increases
aggressiveness or risk-taking—rather than overconfidence—could be
advantageous. However, the decision-mechanism leading to
overconfidence (and as specified in our model) differs in important
ways from these alternatives.
Aggression implies a willingness to attack whether you believe
you will win or not. Risk-taking implies a willingness to attack
despite a (recognized) low probability of winning. Overconfident
states do not fit either description—they only attack when they
believe they will win. Overconfidence therefore represents a very
different assessment and decision-making mechanism from
aggression and risk-taking. Our model focuses specifically on
overconfidence, operationalized as states believing they are
stronger than they are in reality, and this bias directly influences
their decision to fight a given opponent or not.
This leads to a related but separate question. If a propensity to
attack other states is advantageous, as it was in our simulations, then
is aggression,risk-taking,oroverconfidencethe best meansto achieve
this behaviour? We suggest that overconfidence may offer the best
proximate mechanism than either aggression or risk-taking, for two
reasons.First,overconfidencedoes takeprobabilitiesofwinninginto
account, even if they are somewhat distorted, and this will lead to
fewer defeats than a pure aggression strategy which ignores them.
Second, overconfidence relies on a very simple rule: overestimating
one’s strength by a fixed amount. This avoids the need for extensive
andaccurate information about true capabilities and probabilitiesof
all actors and outcomes typically required of a risk preference
approach. Overconfidence is bounded, efficient, and fast—
considerations that may have been particularly important if it
emerged though an evolutionary process.
Discussion
Contrary to intuition, a bias towards overconfidence can be an
advantageous strategy. Despite wide variations in the basic
parameters of our model, overconfident states consistently came
to predominate over time at the expense of unbiased and
underconfident competitors. The extent to which overconfidence
pays off may actually be rather conservative in our model because,
in the real world, believing or signalling that one has exaggerated
strength through overconfidence can also serve to: (1) deter rivals
[30,31]; (2) attract allies; (3) extract greater concessions in
bargaining; (4) increase resolve [17,30]; (5) hedge against worse
errors [33,34]; (6) garner public support for war; and (7) win
elections. None of these effects are included in our model, but all
suggest additional mechanisms by which overconfidence can lead
to adaptive advantages.
Overconfidence may seem an implausible strategy because it
violates conventional formulations of rationality [1]. However, the
appropriate metric of success in competitive situations is
‘‘ecological rationality’’—the strategy that best exploits the
prevailing environment, whatever that strategy may be [37,50].
It is also important to recognize that overconfidence can spread
via more than one mechanism. For example, if the strategy of
overconfidence represents an ideology (akin to a gene), and the
states represent the entities that carry these ideologies (akin to an
individual organism) then, as in conventional natural selection,
overconfidence as a strategy can spread even if it causes many of
its bearers to die [51]. This is supported by recent modelling which
suggests that a trait for risking death in war could arise through
cultural group selection where there is strong inter-group
competition [52,53].
Overconfidence is not the best strategy under all conditions. We
have already noted that unbiased or underconfident strategies
would do better if w,0.5. To further examine the constraints of
overconfidence, we added war costs c, making violent interaction
between states increasingly expensive. As well as the gains and
losses from the outcomes of war (the win/loss of a province, the latter
of which already represented a cost of war within our model, but
was limited to the loser only), the act of fighting now inflicts a given
damage to each opponent, which is deducted from its resource
level. War costs for a given state A are determined as a share q of
the resources invested in the conflict by its opponent (the target
state, T): cA=q *R T,0 ,q,1. As before, aRA determines decisions
for war, while RA determines war outcomes. Clearly, and
unsurprisingly, there are limits on the advantages of overconfi-
dence as the costs of fighting increase (see Figure 4). While this
may appear to undermine the adaptive advantages of overconfi-
dence in war, note that: (1) overconfidence can remain the
predominant strategy even when war is costly, up to a point; (2)
overconfidence would remain the predominant strategy over a
larger range of war costs if the attack threshold is increased
(w.0.5); and (3) importantly, conflict in our model was always
assumed to be zero-sum (one state wins 1 unit of territory at the
expense of the opponent losing that 1 unit). In the real world,
conflicts are often fought over non-zero-sum stakes, such as
resources or land that neither actor owns in the first place. As
the ratio of the value of the prize increases relative to the costs
incurred in trying to obtain it, again overconfidence would
become the predominant strategy over a larger range of war costs.
Finally, note that political leaders—those making the decisions for
war—do not always expect or personally experience any costs of
war, even though they tend to reap its spoils. It is therefore unclear
whether the costs of war would necessarily impact on the selection
of overconfident traits at all, let alone succeed in counteracting
evolved psychological propensities towards overconfidence in the
modern world.
Do the advantages of overconfidence identified in our model
have real-world empirical validity? The lottery effect certainly has
some real-world analogues. Historically, successful conquerors are
typically those that made aggressive moves to gain early footholds,
which solidified their own position and disadvantaged rivals, as
exemplified in the so-called ‘‘scramble for Africa’’ and the
conquest of the Indian subcontinent [54,55]. Moreover, in
international relations theory, Stephen Van Evera cites as one of
the four main causes of war the situation in which states see the
chance to gain some resource that will facilitate future cumulative
gains later on [9].
The power of offensive alliances also has real-world analogues.
States and political elites have historically found it easy to combine
forces where there is an opportunity to exploit weak rivals, while
the converse of forming defensive alliances to help others in danger
is extremely hard and suffers from an intense free-rider problem
[56,57]. Although defensive alliances have commonly occurred in
the face of great mutual threats (such as against Germany in WW
II), they depend on complex agreements or treaties that require
considerable coordination and credible signals of commitment.
States—especially weak states—often have a greater incentive to
‘‘bandwagon’’ with a powerful aggressor rather than taking the
risk of ‘‘balancing’’ against them, since others may defect on such
collective action leaving a balancer exposed and vulnerable.
International relations theorists have also noted an interaction
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actual defensive advantages (where w.0.5) leads to more free-
riding and the avoidance of defensive alliances [58]—precisely the
kind of world in which we expect overconfidence to spread.
Our model obviously lacks many aspects of realism—for
example, states may not always be searching for opportunities to
attack each other at every turn, and we do not allow states to learn
from their own experience, or from observing others. Allowing
periods of peace or learning in the model, however, would not
change our results. Reducing the frequency of war would simply
slow down the model, but does not alter the differential advantages
of alternative strategies when wars occur. Conversely, allowing
states to copy the strategies of successful competitors would simply
speed up the model, since states would learn that overconfidence is
the winning strategy and this would be rapidly copied from state to
state rather than having to wait for the selection effects of pre-
existing overconfident states to spread, one province at a time.
Finally, as discussed above, in the real world expansionist states
tend to be balanced by alliances of other powers [57]. However,
the interesting thing about this is that offensive alliances can
emerge automatically in our model whereas defensive alliances
cannot. Defensive alliances require special conditions to be added
ex ante. International security regimes such as NATO arise
precisely because of the danger of expansionist states and the
inability of weak targets to protect themselves without binding
prior commitments to solve the collective action problem.
Our model suggests that the broad macro-historical process of
inter-state competition may have selected for overconfidence,
simply because it was—at some point—a successful strategy in
competition with alternative strategies. However, while overcon-
fidence may have been adaptive state behaviour in historical
contexts, we do not claim that it remains adaptive behaviour
today. While states and their ruling elites may have reaped great
personal or national benefits from war until recent times [2,3],
and/or learned that bellicosity is an effective strategy (from their
own or other states’ histories), wars in the 21
st century have
increasing domestic, international, and economic costs—low
casualty tolerance, norms against conquest, legal responsibilities,
intervention by collectives such as the UN or NATO, and the
great resolve of nationalist insurgencies [7,20,59,60,61]. It is
therefore likely that, today, overconfidence does nothing more
than hinder political adjustment to the increasing costs of modern
war. Unfortunately, given a deeply rooted human psychology that
tends to bias decision-making towards hawkish behaviour [25,30],
overconfidence is likely to remain a prevalent political phenom-
enon, even if it causes considerable death and destruction for little
gain.
Supporting Information
Movie S1 Quicktime movie of a single simulation run as
displayed in Figure 3a, showing the actual step-by-step
interactions of states on the grid.
(MP4)
Table S1 Simulation results using alternative parame-
ter settings. As reported in the main paper, overconfi-
Figure 4. Median confidence factor at the end of the simulation decreases as war costs increase (line represents the median of 200
simulations for each level of war costs). Overconfident states prevail in the population as long as war costs are relatively low. As war costs
increase they counteract the favourable effect of overconfidence. Note, however, that this decrease would be offset by altering other settings of the
model, such as increasing the attack threshold, w, above 0.5, or allowing the spoils of victory to exceed the losses of defeat, instead of the current
setup in which there is a zero-sum gain or loss of a province.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020851.g004
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our agent-based model, as long as war costs remained
relatively low. Here we show that the predominance of
overconfidence is robust to large changes in model parameters.
The table reports the results of simulations with all combinations
of the following alternative parameter values: (1) the size of the
grid (20620, 30630, or 40640); (2) whether the grid was a finite
square with borders, or a continuous wrap-around Torus with no
borders (yes/no); (3) the initial polarity (number of states) on the
grid (10, 50, or 100); (4) the decisiveness of conflict, k (3, 5, or 7);
and (5) the standard deviation of the initial distribution of
confidence factors, a (0.5, 1.0, or 1.5). The final column in each
row displays the median confidence after 50 runs with different
random seeds. Each individual run continued until one of two
termination criteria occurred: (1) 50 time steps with no fighting; or
(2) only one state was left. In the majority of cases, only one state
remained. In all cases, the median confidence factor at the end of
the simulation was greater than 1.0, corresponding to the
predominance of the overconfident strategy (for all the simulation
results in the table, summary statistics for median confidence
factors are: mean=1.611, standard deviation=0.467, range
1.047–3.091). In all cases reported here, war costs were zero (see
main text for the effects of war costs), and the initial confidence
parameter distribution was set to a mean of zero (which
corresponds to an unbiased population on average).
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